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Introduction
Illicit drug use and drug-related crime impose significant costs on the US and various source and transshipment countries. Though the importance, the implications, and the cost-effectiveness of demand-side interventions is stressed in various publications, e.g. [Behrens et al., 2000; Everingham et al., 1995; Rydell and Everingham, 1994; Rydell et al., 1996; Tragler et al., 2001] , domestic enforcement plays the key role in the fight against drug abuse. For instance, according to [Rydell and Everingham, 1994] in the year 1992 $ 0.9 billion were spent on source country control, $ 1.7 billion on interdiction, the lion share of $ 9.5 billion on domestic enforcement and only $ 0.9 billion on treatment programs. Domestic enforcement often appears in form of crackdowns, i.e. "intensive local enforcement efforts directed at a particular geographic target for a limited time" [Kleiman, 1988] .
In the US, ample literature was devoted to the impacts of crackdowns, e.g. [Barnett, 1988; Caulkins et al., 1993; Moore and Kleiman, 1989; Kleiman, 1988; Zimmer, 1987] . There have also been attempts to explain the effect of cracking down on illicit open-air drug markets by means of mathematical models -mainly to figure out an optimal police enforcement strategy, e.g. [Baveja et al., 1993 , Caulkins, 1993 . All these models are based upon investigations of an average representative dealer's behavior, which implies the assumption that dealers are identical and act independently from each other. But dealers will, with all likelihood, be affected by the behavior of other dealers and certainly by their number within the same market [Caulkins, 1993] .
As surveyed in [Dawid, 1999] , several researchers have propagated in recent years the use of agent-based computational models to describe the adaptive behavior of heterogeneous individuals in economic systems. Using such an approach not only allows us to examine the transient behavior of economic systems before they settle down in an equilibrium but also features of social learning like imitation and communication effects which cannot be dealt with in an representative agent model. Our approach to consider the whole variety of human behavior is the use of Genetic Algorithms (GAs), see [Goldberg, 1989; Dawid, 1999] , as a model of adaptive behavior in a population of boundedly rational individuals. GAs have been recently used to enlighten on adaptive behavior in several economic models, e.g. [Andreoni and Miller, 1995; Arifovic, 1994 Arifovic, , 1995 Arifovic, , 1996 Dawid, 1999; Franke, 1998 ], especially, because in several of these contributions, e.g. [Arifovic, 1994 [Arifovic, , 1995 it is shown that Genetic Algorithms are well-suited tools to describe Genetic Learning of Nash Equilibria in Illicit Drug Markets -2 -actual human learning behavior and match experimental results often better than standard learning rules, like least-square learning or stochastic approximation.
Contrary to the standard representative agent approach each single agent in the system (in our model each dealer and each police unit) is represented by a binary string and, thus, the entire interaction -within and between populations -may be explicitly modeled (see e.g. [Kirman, 1997] for a more thorough discussion of this point).
In our model a drug dealer's risk of detection is described as a function of market size, enforcement pressure, and the dealer's individual effort. We will investigate the ability to "learn useful strategies" from other individuals. We will pay particular attention to prerequisites which could lead to the extinction of the illicit drug market, like a high minimum income level from dealers' illegal activities or a high maximal level of enforcement of the police force and study conditions which imply that the behavioral patterns of dealers and police units converge to a state corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of the underlying economic system. It will however become apparent than in certain scenarios the long run outcome of the model differs from that made by equilibrium theory and can only be understood if the transient learning behavior of both populations is taken into account.
The Model
To model the interactions between police units and dealers on an open-air drugmarket as well as the day-to-day changes in their behavior, we regard police and dealers as members of different groups, so-called "populations". These populations at time t are denoted by
, where time evolves in discrete steps, . Each unit in each population is then represented by a binary string encoding its action. In each period, t, each unit receives some payoff for its chosen action, which defines the so-called fitness value. Using these values, which depend on the actions of all other agents in the system (both dealers and police units), the succeeding popu-
, are created (see Figure 1 ) using the Genetic Operators (GO) described in Section 3. [Becker, 1968] claims in his economic approach of criminality that individuals are supposed to maximize their utility functions of any form in a rational way. Consequently, they are deterred from committing a crime either by a high probability of being detected (and incarcerated) or by the extent of punishment. [Pyle, 1995] Thus, dealers exercise in their behavior not only an influence on the most successful ones in their neighborhood, but also on the threat imposed by actual, or just expected, police enforcement.
Crackdowns raise non-monetary costs, so-called search time costs, of locating, purchasing and using drugs [Moore, 1973; Kleiman, 1988] . Thus, they reduce the availability of drugs without having an increasing effect on the prices. (This effect of higher prices is not desirable because it does not shrink the demand for drugs, but may raise the expenditures and, consequently, the amount of street crimes.)
The Fitness of Police
In the case of a planned crackdown, officials determine the enforcement efforts allocated to the market on day t. Though it is not desired to arrest as many dealers as possible because tight prison capacities act as a binding constant [Chaiken and Chaiken, 1991] , the number of incarcerations may be treated as a generalized measure for the efficiency of police enforcement efforts. The smaller the current market size, the larger will be the current benefits of the decision-makers, because violence and street crimes associated with drug dealing will be reduced, the quality of life in the affected neighborhoods will improve, and safety will increase in the perception of the residents.
Let it e denote the fraction of police unit i's time available allocated to the market on day t, e.g. in a pre-crackdown phase this might include conventional police enforcement by uniformed patrol officers, but not activities like obtaining warrants, doing paperwork or testifying in court. In the crackdown phase, however, mostly 
The Fitness of Dealers
According to Becker's economic approach of criminality [Becker, 1968] , individuals will commit a crime only if the expected benefit from illegal activity exceeds the . [Baveja et al., 1996] argued that financial despair is a reason that forces dealers to deal even during a crackdown. Hence, we assume that a "minimum income" has to be earned in the market to afford living and possibly addiction. This minimum profit is supposed to be equal for all dealers in the market of concern, and is assured by a minimum availability, . Note, that if a dealer stays away from the market for x successive days, it is assumed that the dealer has left the market. This fact is not described by the fitness functions, but modeled by a specific encoding mechanism which is explained in Section 3. The possibility of not dealing includes the chance of moving into another market temporarily, but displacement is not addressed in particular in this model.
We assume that customers do not have preferences for a certain dealer. Furthermore, we do not take into consideration that different drugs have different prices, i.e. we treat drugs homogeneously, but exclude diverted pharmaceuticals because they are not widely sold in street markets. Let
denote the total availability of dealers in the market at time t. Dealer j's generalized profit is then derived from the amount of drugs sold daily, correlated with his/her availability, and is affected negatively by the availability of all other dealers in the market.
Since we assume drug dealers to be risk-averse, the curve representing j's generalized profit will increase at a decreasing rate, and has the shape of a concave utility function, where the demand parameter, γ, may be regarded as a measure for the efficiency of the dealer's strains to supply addicts with drugs, ( 
). Furthermore, jt r is assumed to be nearly indirectly proportional to the time all dealers actually spend in the market, i.e. to the current market size, t A . Hence, we will refer to the following functional expression as dealer j's risk of de-
Finally, we have to determine the costs of dealers, which are mainly non-monetary ones, like opportunity costs in case of arrest, and threats of violence imposed by competitors within the market. These "costs" are modeled by a convex function
. Since we regard dealers as risk-averse individuals, and the risk aversion coefficient ρ is constant throughout a city [Caulkins, 1993] , we assume that a quadratic function gives a useful approximation for dealer j's costs at time t, where the parameter δ can be seen as a measure for a dealer's individual valuation of the risk of detection.
( )
6
Now we are able to design the fitness functions
, corresponding to the payoffs, for the "dealer population" of generation
, which indirectly depend on the actual number of dealers t m (Note, that t m is exogenously determined at the beginning of a simulation at time 0 = t , but will change over time.),
The artificial drug market model, ( ) 3 and ( ) Genetic Learning of Nash Equilibria in Illicit Drug Markets -7 -
The Structure of a Simple Genetic Algorithm
To implement the evolution of the modeled drug market according to a Simple Genetic Algorithm (SGA), the current choices of the efforts of all individuals are encoded by binary strings of predetermined length, separately for each population.
Either of the initial populations,
, is then generated randomly. (In cases where one wants to follow the development of a particular initial population, what has to be determined exogenously.) The encoding mechanism for the dealer and police population works as follows.
• ).
• Strings in the dealer population are of length 2 l , where the last bit in the strings determines whether the corresponding dealer exits from the market (
). In the latter case, the remaining bits encode the frac- ). If dealer j leaves the market for "economic reasons", the corresponding string, j b , becomes inactive (
), and the Genetic Operators are no longer applied to it. Of course, a dealer whose strategy is encoded by an active string could also "decide not to deal" for a day or two, but after 3 days of successively not dealing, the dealer is said to have left the market -and the string encoding his/her action is deactivated. With a very small probability, ζ, however, a dealer can "decide to return into the market".
Similar to the application of the mutation operator, which is discussed below, the last bit of an inactive string,
, is inverted with probability t P . In this case, dealer j re-enters the market with the same strategy pursued prior to exiting.
Needless to say that the procedure discussed above is not the only possible way to encode the strategies of dealers and police units. One could also add bits encoding reasons, apart from "economic" ones, which drive a dealer to leave the market, e.g. the case of an arrest, death, or the decision to stop dealing altogether Genetic Learning of Nash Equilibria in Illicit Drug Markets -8 --and earn a living from alternative employment. Furthermore, one might also add a bit in each string, j b , of the police population, encoding the decision of showing any effort at all. But this would lead into the field of corruption, which is not a topic of the present paper.
At each time step t, each string in both populations is assigned a fitness value.
According to ( ) 3 and ( ) 7 , this value in either of the populations depends on the values of the other strings in both populations. Within the framework of GAs the fitness values have to be positive, whereas the functions defined by ( ) 3 and ( ) 7 may become negative. While dealers associated with negative fitness values leave the market for "economic reasons", police units, associated with higher costs than benefits, cannot do so. Therefore, the fitness values used for selection in the police population are linear transforms of the values given in ( ) 3 which guarantee positivity,
Then, the transition from one generation to the succeeding one is executed by the application of the following GA Operators, separately for each population [Dawid, 1999] .
A. Proportional Selection
The Selection Operator (SO) models an imitation effect within a population. Individuals with low payoffs will very likely imitate those with high payoffs. Therefore, the strings encoding successful strategies will spread over the entire population t P . The SO builds up a mating pool by selecting κ strings from population. This is done by κ random draws with replacement. The probability of string k b to be drawn is proportional to its fitness ( )
. In other words, the SO determines which strings are allowed to inherit their genetic material to the succeeding generation 1 + t P . Then, the Crossover Operator (CO) followed by the Mutation Operator (MO) are applied to the mating pool.
B. Crossover
Within a single population, individuals will be influenced by others, even if they do not imitate each other. The whole -or only notions of their -strategy is adopted. This gives strings with high fitness a chance to produce even better individuals. To implement this, the mating pool, created by the SO, is randomly split into 2 κ pairs and then the CO is applied to each randomly chosen pair within the mating pool with crossover probability, 
C. Mutation
The MO models some kind of innovation: Either actions are randomly mistaken or dealers and police units, respectively, think that the best strategy has not yet been found. With probability 3 10 − = µ each bit in each string is inverted ( 0 1 → and 1 0 → , respectively). Thus, with very small probability, strings come into existence, which can not be found in the initial generation. Now, 1 + t P is created and the procedure will be repeated until all strings are equal, or a predetermined number of iteration steps T is reached. In the setup presented here, the fitness of a string in either of the populations depends on the values of other strings in both populations. Such a situation, which is quite customary in economic models and quite different from the standard applications where GAs are used to solve static optimization problems, was analyzed by [Dawid, 1999] . He refers to such models as "GAs with state-dependent fitness functions" and show how possible outcomes of simulations in such models are characterized. In particular, he shows that a population state, which is the result of a GA simulation, is not necessarily an equilibrium of the underlying economic system, and describes the possible impact of variations in implementation details (like the encoding scheme, the crossover probability or fitness re-scaling). Taking these findings into account, we keep in mind to be very careful when interpreting our results in economic terms.
Results of Numerical Simulations
In this section, we will discuss characteristic simulation results obtained when using the model described in the previous sections. Basic questions to be answered when an agent-based model of adaptive behavior is used are always as to whether robust convergent patterns of behavior can be observed and in how far the long-run simulation outcomes of the model correspond to the fully rational equilibrium behavior of the corresponding static model. Though, strictly speaking, GAs never converge if the mutation rate is positive, we will use the term "convergence" to outline a state where one strategy spreads over the entire groups (of dealers and police units), and the only fluctuations within the populations are due We are particularly interested in conditions which guarantee the learning of the Nash equilibrium, and in the analysis of prerequisites implying a successful crackdown in the sense that the market ceases to exist and does not revive after police efforts are reduced.
Equilibrium Properties of the Underlying Economic System
We will proceed by determining the values ( ) Whereas it is not clear in general whether the solution to this set of equations is unique in all the cases we consider in the numerical analysis this is the case. The equilibrium availability of a dealer, * a , grows with an increasing value of the fraction δ γ (the larger δ γ is, the more profitable it is for dealers to stay in the market.). Thus, the ratio δ γ can be seen as a "measure of profitability of selling drugs" or "dealers' weighted efficiency parameter", i.e. if the demand is sufficiently large, the fear of arrest will be overthrown by the desire for profit (Similar arguments hold for β α and equilibrium police enforcement efforts.). Note that ( ) * a *, e prevails untouched by parameter changes in α and β ( γ and δ ) as long as the fraction β α ( δ γ ) stays constant.
In spite of these results, a general analytic solution to the system of nonlinear equations, ( ) 9 and ( ) 10 , cannot be given -but of course the equilibrium values can be easily calculated numerically for any given parameter set. We will focus on situations where equilibrium behavior is not restricted by the bounds Having identified some conditions guaranteeing that the Nash equilibrium of the game is in I , let us now consider the effect of variations in the parameter values on the level of the equilibrium, ( )
, by means of standard sensitivity analysis.
• Parameters pertaining to the enforcement units' fitness The reaction of the equilibrium level of police enforcement efforts to changes in the parameters α and β is intuitively appealing. The enforcement level * e increases almost linearly with increasing values of the parameter measuring a police unit's efficiency, α. Certainly, an increasing valuation of the costs imposed on a police unit by a crackdown, β, reduces enforcement activities. Considering the parameters in equation ( ) 3 -the "police fitness function" -it turns out that changes Genetic Learning of Nash Equilibria in Illicit Drug Markets -12 -in α have almost no impact on the dealers' modeled presence in the market as long as enforcement is sufficiently large, i.e. as long as total enforcement dominates the functional expression describing the risk of detection. Due to the concavity of the risk of being detected and arrested with respect to enforcement pressure, E, a dealer's costs change only little for larger values of total enforcement, while the marginal costs are large for a small enforcement level. Hence, the equilibrium level of the dealer's activities is fairly robust with respect to parameter changes, if the base case values of α and β are expected to be larger -causing a higher equilibrium level of police enforcement activities. While one-sided changes in the parameters pertaining to the dealers' fitness values, γ and δ, exhibit a simultaneous effect on the level of the economic equilibrium, i.e. * a and * e grow or decline simultaneously, the results of one-sided changes in the parameters pertaining to the fitness of police, α and β, are of opposite nature (see Figures 3 and 4 ).
• Parameters pertaining to the dealers' fitness
The level of the economic equilibrium decreases if the parameter γ decreases.
More precisely, changes in γ scale linearly in the dealers' equilibrium level of time available spent in the market, while the equilibrium level of police enforcement efforts is a concave function in γ (see Figure 4) . As the parameter γ is assumed to be a measure for the efficiency of the dealers' efforts, γ cannot be affected by enGenetic Learning of Nash Equilibria in Illicit Drug Markets -13 -forcement measures in the framework of our model. A way of shrinking its value is to reduce the attraction of drugs to present and future customers. Combined demand-side measures -like school-based prevention programs, treatment programs, and social politics measures, which cover the access to education, employment and affordable accommodation -are appropriate means to achieve the desired reduction in the extent of the efficiency of the dealers' efforts. The parameter δ reflects a dealer's individual valuation of the risk of being detected and arrested, which is independent of concrete -costly -enforcement, grows, dealers will spend less time selling drugs (see Figure 5) . Consequently, less enforcement effort is necessary to suppress illicit drug trade. (Recall that the probability of an arrest is high for small values of * a .) The impact of an increment in δ was evidenced beautifully, when in Link Valley, Texas, a planned crackdown received so much media attention that dealers even stopped dealing in anticipation of increased street-level enforcement [Kennedy, 1990] .
• Parameters pertaining to the probability of an arrest
The larger the parameter θ, the larger the influence of the total availability of dealers in the illicit drug market compared to the influence of total enforcement. An increase in θ decreases the probability of an arrest. Consequently, dealers feel attracted to spend more time in the market. Since police units derive their benefits proportionally to the expected number of arrests, they increase their activities too. 
Description of the Simulation Setup
Having analyzed some qualitative properties of equilibrium behavior in the strategic interaction between dealers and police, we will now return to our model with boundedly rational adaptive agents. We will discuss typical simulation results obtained when using the model described in the previous sections. These results inGenetic Learning of Nash Equilibria in Illicit Drug Markets -15 -clude conditions which guarantee that the GA-based model learns the Nash equilibrium of the underlying economic system, and the effects of the constraints on the time available spent in the market by either of the agents. Since all these descriptions represent only single -though exemplary -elements out of a huge set of simulations (approx. 2400 runs) done for different parameter constellations a word about the common features of the simulation runs.
For the entire set of simulations of the evolution of an open-air drug market we fix the maximum number of iteration steps at 1000 = T . Both initial populations are generated randomly based on system time. For each parameter constellation we perform at least 10 simulations to guarantee that the long-run results do not depend on the initial configuration of the populations. 1 We assume, that the ratio of the average time available allocated to the market by dealers and police units has advantages as a general measure of the situation in an open-air drug market compared to the ratio of the actual numbers, and that this ratio is limited to be less than 1:30 for
the transition from one generation to the succeeding one is realized by the application of the Genetic Operators described in Section 3, separately for each population. The present model is fairly robust with respect to (small) fluctuations in the probabilities χ, µ, and ζ, where their base case values are assumed to be χ=0.7 and µ=ζ=0.001.
Learning Nash Equilibria
The results of the set of numerical simulations strongly support the conclusion that an interior economic equilibrium, ( )
, is approximated by genetic learning with the restriction,
• that the constraint of police enforcement efforts has to exceed the equilibrium value sufficiently, i.e. • that the dealers' income level from their illegal activity has to be of appropriate size, i.e.
The long-run simulation outcomes do not deviate from each other for different initial populations, but the "speed of convergence" does. Remember that we use the term "convergence" to outline a state, where one strategy spreads over the entire group (of dealers and police units, respectively), and the only fluctuations within the populations are due to mutations. . Consequently, total police enforcement is not constrained at all -except by the natural "24 hours a day"-boundary -and dealers are supposed to be forced to spend at least 1% of their time available in the market to earn their living. • The effect of the constraint on enforcement measures Police enforcement measures are constrained due to personnel costs and bounded human resources. As mentioned already in condition ( ) 12 , a low-level constraint of total police enforcement efforts prevents the system from learning the Nash equilibrium, and, hence, foils the implementation of the optimal enforcement strategy. If for the (paradigmatic) numerical simulation depicted in Figure   8 . We observe that in the initial phase of the crackdown, the number of dealers' in the market cannot be reduced sufficiently, the aggregate time dealers spend in the market is still too long and enforcement efforts stick to the upper bound (until the end of the simulation run). So, the number of dealers and the average time every member of the population of dealers cannot be reduced to the equilibrium value * a . To reach the equilibrium it would be necessary to provide for a short time additional enforcement resources, which could be achieved by diversion of officers from patrol functions into street-level drug enforcement, to assure an optimal long run policy.
• The effect of the minimum income level of availability
The success of a modeled crackdown crucially depends on the offenders' current minimum income level, min a . In the framework of our model we talk of a successful crackdown if Intensive enforcement tries to reduce the average availability of dealers. But, on average, this value cannot be pressed below amin.
For t≥40 maximum enforcement is reduced by 25% and the market pops back. We talk of a relapse. Figure 10 ).
As we know from condition ( ) 13 the market is cracked up immediately for
The model therefore provides insights which are very important in order to predict under which scenarios a crackdown will be successful. The market structure and the dealers' willingness and possibility of remaining in the market have to be examined very carefully -especially since this minimum level is in general difficult to estimate.
Success of Crackdowns
To examine the question, under which parameter constellation a crackdown is successful, more systematically we will now compare the long run outcome of our simulation model with the Nash equilibrium solution for a larger set of parameter constellations. In particular, we will focus on the question how the dealers' efficiency parameter, γ, and costs parameter, δ, influence the chances of a successful crackdown. Considering the police parameters α, β instead would yield qualitatively similar results. In what follows the long run average availability of dealers in the our simulation studies is denoted by LR-a, and the average long-run enforcement effort by LR-e. The equilibrium values are again denoted by * a and * e .
For the calculations visualized in Figure 11 , we choose a minimum availability of 10% of the dealers' time available in the market. A lower level of minimum availability of dealers in the market shifts the crackdown plane forward, and -more desirably -a higher level provides a larger chance for the success of a crackdown (by shifting the plane backwards) -note that we consider a modeled crackdown to have failed if the GA converges towards a value ( )
Figure 11 demonstrates that a crackdown is successful only if the expected costs of dealers are relatively large compared to their drug selling efficiency. Otherwise, the drug market reemerges after the end of the crackdown and the system ends up at the interior Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to notice that the curve separating the parameter regions of successful and not successful crackdowns is almost linear, which allows to deduce some "crucial ratio" of efficiency and cost parameters which might be used to forecast successes of crackdowns in real world markets where the corresponding parameters have been estimated. Similar analyses could of course also be carried out for other parameter combinations but we will not provides the details here. 
Conclusion
The model developed in this paper captures the day-to-day changes in the behavior of dealers and police units who interact in a local drug market. We consider the interior of the strategy spaces. We derive conditions when the modeled agents learn the Nash equilibrium of the underlying economic system and also point out when enforcement will be above the equilibrium level in the long run and when the market can be destroyed due to a successful crackdown.
Successful crackdown
Genetic Learning of Nash Equilibria in Illicit Drug Markets -22 -This findings imply that a way to increase chances of a successful crackdown is shrinking the drug selling efficiency of dealers and increasing their expected costs of drug dealing. The former can be done by lowering the demand for drugs by combined demand side measures, whereas the latter can be achieved by increasing the fear of detection. According to our insights increasing dealers' costs by a certain percentage should have a very similar effect -as far as the success chances of a crackdown are concerned -than a decrease of their sales by the same percentage.
Limitations of the model are given by the fact that some of the parameters crucial for the success of a crackdown are extremely difficult to estimate e.g. the minimum income of dealers and the individual valuation of the risk of detection and arrest. This also applies to the number of dealers in the market in the pre-crackdown phase. Furthermore, we do not discuss displacement, though the occurrence of displacement does not necessarily imply that crackdowns on a specific market won't be a great benefit. At least, the affected neighborhood has the chance to be restored and connections between dealers and consumers can be cut for a while.
These severe restrictions to the model discussed in this paper suggest several extensions which might be the object of future research, as do other features of drug markets and their participants:
• Simulation techniques like Genetic Algorithms allow to easily create populations consisting of different individuals with different learning patterns and can therefore also be used to simulate the contest between two paradigms within a population. One could distinguish between dealers who deal to support their own drug habit (usually trading in small volumes and infrequently) and those who trade in larger amounts as business. In both cases they must have ready access to a supply of the product to sell. If the supply is tightly controlled, new dealers may find it hard to enter the market. Among these dealers one could distinguish between dealers who have specialized in the trade with particular drugs, and finally, the population of dealers could subsequently be subdivided on the basis of prior arrests. Dealers who already have a police record face a higher risk of incarceration than others.
• The differences in the perception of dealers' risk aversion exceed what can be captured by a single parameter. According to these differences one could subdivide the population of dealers and investigate which values of the risk aversion parameter would spread over the population. The same counts for the efficiency of the dealers' efforts or their individual valuation of the risk of being detected and arrested.
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• Pre-and post-crackdown markets follow different dynamics than markets during a crackdown. Especially the efficiencies of police enforcement efforts differ, since pre-and post-crackdown markets are likely to be kept under surveillance by conventional police enforcement while crackdowns are mostly conducted by narcotics officers. What could also be taken into consideration for further investigation are "business-as-usual" markets which could be modeled as a problem of financial corruption.
